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Intense fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan is taking place in proximity to Iran’s northwestern border, which it
shares with both countries. While Turkey has sided  rmly with Azerbaijan and Russia stands behind Armenia, Iran
may face the greatest risk of any neighboring country because the war has resulted in vocal domestic opposition,
sparked tensions with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and carries the risk of a potential spill-over into Iranian territory.
Iran has a substantial Azerbaijani minority – approximately one-third of the population – which is protesting
Tehran’s support for Armenia. Most of Iran’s Azerbaijani population is concentrated near its border with the con ict
zone, but Tehran also has a signi cant Azerbaijani community. The outbreak of  ghting last week has prompted
protests in multiple Iranian cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, Urmia, and Zanjan. More than 20 Azerbaijani activists in
Ardebil have been arrested, and Amnesty International has warned that they are at risk. Unrest among Azerbaijanis
may augment ongoing anti-regime activity.
The current protests demand that Tehran stop Russian convoys to supply Armenia via Iran, as con rmed by Iranian
state television. Representatives of the Azerbaijani community in Iran have also threatened to disrupt the convoys if
they continue. Iranian of cials acknowledge that Tehran has supported Armenia since the onset of the latter’s
con ict with Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, out of fear that Azerbaijan could attract Iran’s own Azerbaijani population.
If domestic Azerbaijani opposition remains active, Tehran may find it difficult to sustain its material support for
Armenia.
Many of the battles between Armenia and Azerbaijan are taking place in close proximity to the Iranian border, leading
Iranian of cials to declare their readiness to defend that border. Already, Azerbaijan has regained control of regions
and infrastructure near the border, such as the Khudafarin bridge on the Araz River. Tehran runs a joint hydroelectric
project near the bridge together with Armenia’s occupation authorities.
Tehran warned both sides to avoid “intrusions” after it alleged that artillery  re hit villages on the Iranian side of the
border. Reportedly, Iran is fortifying its troops and air defenses in the region. The return of Baku’s control over some
Armenian-occupied territories bordering Iran now lengthens the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, something
Tehran has worked to avoid, preferring an Armenian presence.
Iranian alignment with Armenia and Russia has also led to tension with Turkey, whose media outlets, including
government-sponsored TRT, have criticized Iran’s support for Armenia. Some Turkish outlets have mocked Iran’s
alleged commitment to “Islamic solidarity” given that it now sides with majority-Christian Armenia. Over the last year,
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Turkey has significantly reduced its imports of natural gas from Iran, a trend that is likely to continue in light of their
further disagreements.
Tehran also is likely not happy that Azerbaijan is using Israeli-supplied weapons in close proximity to Iran’s border.
Israel’s support for Azerbaijan also seems to be fostering appreciation for Israel among a signi cant number of
Azerbaijanis in Iran. Since Turkey and Israel both support Azerbaijan, this may provide an opportunity for Ankara and
Jerusalem to improve relations.
While Russia and Turkey may each gain from the developments in the Armenia-Azerbaijan con ict, it seems that
Tehran only loses.
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